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investig on Oswald
FBI reports NOT in CIA's possession, before
22 Nov 1963.

(b) Report dated 7 March 1961. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. by ^{SA} John W. Fain,
Dallas Office of the FBI, 10 numbered
pages. [This report is a chronological
account of Oswald's life from
birth to his departure to the USSR and
indicates he was contemplating
return to the US. (We received this
report on 9 Mar 1961)]

(a) Report dated June 3, 1960. To the
Office of Security of the Department
of State. ¹⁹⁶⁰ Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald
Refers to Foreign Service Report no. 234
of 2 Nov 1955 and other ^{earlier} reports
on the case and draws attention to
the fact that background checks
could be made of Oswald's
the birth certificate surrendered
by Oswald to the Soviets. (We
received this report on —
1975)

(c) Report dated 10 July 1962. Title:
Lee Harvey Oswald. By ^{5th} John W.
Fair, Dallas office. 14 pages
[Covers background info re
subject stay in USSR and
records subject denied the
recruitment by Sov. IS. or any
deal with the Soviet government]
(We received this report on 9
March 1964.)

(d) Report dated 31 October 1962.
Title: Lee Harvey Oswald - Early
life in New Orleans and
activities for Fair Play for
Cuba Committee. Report by
St. Milton R. Kaack. 16
pages. (We received this by
letter from T. Edgar Hoover on
9 March 1964.)

Nats

1. Circumstantial Facts: from late Sept - 22 Nov the case was handled as a matter of ordinary business in both Mexi and in Hqs. Handling was by the book, bearing in mind @ Mexico Station had a large on going case load. and @ LHO, once identified (by self) and reported (8th Oct) to Hqs^(9th) and disseminated (10th) was a Navy and FBI case under the delimitations agreement. ^{Views & conclusions pronounced by Hqs on 14 Oct 1964 met to what was credible fact at the time leaving the whole case open to further facts (see delimitation)}

2. Criticisms can be sustained against Mexico Sta and Hqs concerning handling between 27 Sept and 22 Nov:

- (1) Mexico Station erred in its forwarding of LHO identification on 8 Oct (based on Voice intercept only) on 10 Oct with ~~an arbitrarily selected~~ description of an individual who entered the USSR Emb. same day. On the evidence there was no reason to believe the person identified by voice intercept made any visit that day. Contra: there was no reason to believe he hadn't or could not have. ^{But ultimately the logic was weak; only individual who could have been. who was not known.}
- (2) Hqs. disseminated the Mexico info of the 8th on the 10th including the audio ^{down} info based on the photograph of unidentified individual.
- (3) In its reply to Mexi on 11th, however, Hqs. gave Mexi a correct description of (Henry) O which was at clear variance with the description of the unidentified individual and should have been sufficient, normally to break any evidential connections between the two facts.
- (4) Mexico Station though asked by Hqs. did not press or secure an identification or followup on LHO before the 22nd of Nov. (i.e. locate where he had stayed, what he had done, when he had arrived or when he had left. NB: neither did

Hqs. can be
criticized for not
pressing the case
for 10 days
prior to
22 Nov.

the legal attache or the Mil. representative or the Embassy (which was informed by the 16th Oct).

(5) Though requested by Mexico Station Hqs. asked the Navy for a photo of the UHO, but did not permit and secure a photo before the 22nd.

(6) Mexico Station did not match the 1 Oct radio intercept with its radio intercept (of 27th and 28th Sept) until after the 22nd Nov event, when it did so with alacrity.

(7) Mexico Station did not match its 1 Oct coverage of the unidentified individual with its coverage of the same individual on 4 Oct in front of the Soviet Embassy and on 15 Oct. in front of the Cuban Embassy until after 22nd Nov.

(8) Despite the discrepancies in description, Mex Station put the 1 Oct photos into the chain of evidence on 22 Nov. 2200 hours. Ultimately the decision having been made by the ^(cable) Ambassador and the Division Chief. In effect, being faced with a fait accompli. (Things notified)

(9) No photo coverage was obtained at any time of UHO in Mexico city. The introd. of the unidentified individual in good faith by COS - was instructive and compromised the operations in the long run, though every effort was made to satisfy the requirements of the Commission and the security of the operations.

(10) Two members of Cuban Int. known to have dealt with UHO: Silvia Simon and Consul Aguirre. Both left & replaced on 7/9 Nov 1968. named.

3. The thrust of Hqs. instructions after the 22nd Nov event was against the USSR press. rather than the Cubans. Coverage very early however, turned up at least one ungratifying intercept:

(a) The Cuban Cables, conversations - affirming of the 22nd which seem not to have gone to the... in November? in this case it be checked

and (b) the ^{two} Brothers - Persons through telephone calls in the — and — ,

and (c) Ambiguous references by Jugoslav ambassador Vlahov -

4. Mexi. coverage after 22nd based on ^{length,} technical coverage, and close utilization of liaison. The two signif. challenges are:

(a) Were the Soviets & Cubans aware of the coverage received & audio before 22nd?

(b) Did Sovs and/or Cubans have penetration in the brotherhood which would have permitted them to blunt the thrust of the ~~top~~ succession of major leads which were investigated tending to show a larger degree of contact between UFD than the ~~presently~~ ^{substantive} details of the intercepts?
Viz: ¹

(1) Case of Gilcherts, Alameda Ugoite - Nica.
requiring walk in 26 Nov. investigation protected through Dec.

(2) Restrictions of the amount of detail given by Silaya Duran. (Can hear lots in May 1967) → Statements to confid. source he trusted? If so there is also reason to review the Clara Carras de las details -) S. Duran was not subjected to a thorough electrolytic examination based on what we know or could surmise from the intercepts.

(3) Ylario Rojas Villanueva case (in broadcastings & program) [This appears to have been rebutted.]

- (4) Case of Elena Garro de Paz. See the numerous reports of Hato Dept Officer, Thomas. This case suggests the possibility that Cuban sources in 60s/61s were in a position to manipulate and circumscribe the Huma Bureau and acting heads affecting themselves, including the Alvarez matter: note the extraordinary points these two attacks have in common - the presence of a red headed negro. (According to Alvarez in the Cuban compound, according to Elena Garro, in attendance at Cuban Bureau's party)

- (5) Observations by Eliz. Cozlett de Moss (Betty Moss) who had ^{visited} accompanied Theodore Lee on his Cuban trip for FPFC org. 28 Dec 62 - 2 Jan 1963 LHO's relationship to FPFC activity is totally unclarified and unbelievable on its face unless it can be assumed that FPFC and Cubans themselves were more aware of what he was doing than they have acknowledged.

she was
on return
flight 2/1/63

- (6) Case of Oscar Contreras. to Am. Cons. Tangier's beginning in May 1967. relation to LHO alleged contact with pro-Castro student groups at U.S. Mexico & his attempt to secure their support for visa conversions.

(7) Betty Moss

5. Acknowledging questionable aspects of LHO's whole Mexico City initiative:

- (a) He denied he had made ^{such a trip} ~~such a trip~~ and got wife to remain silent about it.

- (b) He was there 4 full days, 2 partial: 11 1/2 hours in all. Assuming 1/3 time at rest, there are 77/78 hours of full time activity unaccounted for. He says on day he left early and returned

to
lets: 87 hours.

Can it be concluded that if he had contact with either Soviets or Cubans or both, that went beyond the transit-vision aspect one into that he was told to assassinate Pres. Kennedy? or anything of that kind? (Consider in this context his subsequent letters to USSR Int. Washington after ^{his} return from Mexico.). Operationally it makes more sense to conclude that his relations were in an elective, developmental stage and that LHD's effort to defect was bona fide. (Note the symbolic identity between his suicide attempt in Moscow in 1959, which tipped the balance in his favor of remaining in the USSR, and the assassinations as his ultimate self-proving (and self-determining) "donations".)

NB: This allows for LHD having said nothing that was self-compromising in his ^{postulation} dealing with Soviets and Cubans, including threats against the lives of prominent anti-Soviet and anti-Castroists which he uttered the Soviets nor Cubans can admit after the events of 22 Nov, they knew.

6. What is the probative value - without factual collateral relating to Mexico and Dallas events - of Castro's statements as reported by AP, on 7 Sept 1963 at Brazilian Embassy reception? Note that VPI version is a signif. element of the AP statement. Without factual collateral its probative value is only as a conditioning factor, which could have operated powerfully on a homicidal individual like LHD. Therefore Castro must bear a significant historical weight for what he said & whether the nature and degree of ^{his} knowledge of plotting against

him, his alive and JFK is dead. Does one condone
an act of assassination where it may have been a
conditioned response by a psychotic person, as
"justifiable homicide". Or worse, do you now conduct
an investigation in such a way as to suggest that
the assassination was, indeed, a justified retorsion? again,
in the absence of factual collateral that goes beyond
what we do know, namely, that LHO was the killer
of JFK and Officer Tippett and that he did it alone.

Ask the same questions of the Santos' observations* to
his Dutch F.O. interviewer: what signif. coincidentally
are he attached to what he said? (Admitted the
remarks gave insight & psych. insight.)

On question of lack of supporting evidential collateral
also recognizing that these were two defector sources
who came out immediately after the assassination, one
Soviet (Nosenko) and the other Cuban (whose info
through of ranging comparative ^{protest} consistency took
both Soviets and Cuban intelligence seriously seriously seriously
off the hook

*NB: On 5 Jan 1962 a brief source had reported C66 call London
MORSE Benito Zahra as having said to the call that
JFK "will die within the present year, 1962" -

1. There is every reason to be unhappy with the work of Penn
on the foreign Communist agents, but it is no benefit @
to shift blame ^{now} on CIA ^{by the US Govt} for allegedly not smashing what the
anti-Castro side were doing, assuming they know. Else for
I know the policy was to deal with the Commies
but NOT to encourage or to become directly involved
in their anti-Castro plotting. @ not recognizing that the
bias of the Commission's leadership & US Govt in 1963 was
clearly against such a theory in the absence of credible
evidence to the contrary. What was to be done: draw
the conclusion in spite of the absence of credible
evidence?

(Note that C/WH specifically complimented CWS Mex for having by his reporting blunted the terrible specter of foreign involvement.)

be put at the working level in CIA — what the FBI's position was or is not known to me — it was felt that this ^{we} report ~~did not~~ could have ^{been more explicit and} left a larger opening for further accumulation of evidence relative to the foreign conspiracy aspect. ~~The~~ Mr. Ullrich was so advised by CFCI Staff at the time. In any case this is a matter of measure or shading and ~~known~~ we are talking here of degrees of emphasis, because the Report properly read does leave the question of ^{the} ultimate responsibility of LHO as a singleton killer open.

What did the Commission Staff itself do to formulate the questions necessary to cover all aspects of the case and to get them investigated - in this instance, by the FBI.

8. Status of info developed abroad re the assassination
is possibly direct bearing on assessment of the
foreign conspiracy theory. = 1964

- (2) Coster was defector 10 May/1 - inf posed
- (4) Novak - early 1964 - inf posed in substance
- (5) Seizure ship - walking Br. Emb. Moscow, ^(29 Aug 1964)
(28 Aug. 1964.) Arrested knew O & inf.
at Gorbi 1960. Mental case.

~~Handwritten text, mostly illegible due to heavy scribbling and crossing out.~~

④ No evidence that topic has been pursued with Latin defectors, including Pastor Hidalgo and Paez.

9. Helms on record re full disclosure of ~~fact~~ facts held by Agency in sworn testimony West. May 6, 1964 (See Vol II: 120 + 129, and by affidavit Exhibits 868 and 869). Also he announced ^{21 Feb} 1965 that in no instance was any doc. withheld from public domain if it had a direct bearing on the assassinations.
10. In general the Oswald case file shows a minimum input from Wove and no concern with the implications of statement/warning by ²statement re Coster on 7 Sept 1963. [Query: what was reaction within WH & at highest levels to that statement? This should be traceable in Telling file, if not Wove, Mannin and Hqs.]
11. Re Mannin O's test. (Vol. I): she asserts her intent was not to go to USSR but to get to Cuba & stay there, somehow get her to join her.
12. Note the persistent interest in Costello & Cuba:
- ① Delgado testimony, ^(Vol. III) re Mannin Corps period in LA area & ^{followed} contact with Cuban Consulate. One visit from unidentified individual & mail receipt. Early identification with Castro revolution.
 - NB: The presumption here is that these would have been Cuban Consulate reporting on LHO going back to 1959 while he was still in the USMC
 - ② See also FRTZ testimony, Vol IV: 224, 228, 239 who is hooked up by WADE, Vol V: 235
 - ③ See Mohrenscholdt testimony, IX: 267,
 - ④ Carlos Brancier testimony concerning ⁴sequence of events beginning on 5 Aug 63 when

NB: The retention unit (Hqs) found

contacted him, requested to buy, offered to train
auto brake cables for info, and attempted to
give him money. This occurred on 9 Aug when
Bungie found LHV bonding agent, wearing a
sign, & using name of Hiddell on behalf of FPCC.
On 12th there was a municipal court action
for which LHV pleaded guilty & paid 11th. On 16th
he was passing out handbills in some cases. Bungie
sent a friend to LHV house on 16th. On 21 Aug. there
was a Radio debate. B. also reports photo of
Ed. Smith of LHV Council of the Americas.
(See also GONAL & Blalock testimony)

NB: it is remarkable that no one apparently focused
on the ~~WATER~~ provocation I had attempted

② What does one make of the Andrews testimony,
of the Peña testimony, Ernesto Rodriguez testi-
mony.

③ What are the implications of O's alleged singlet
activities in H.O. on behalf of the FPCC? Can
one accept the idea he had no guidance or
contacts after he had begun to write & later
con. by Los Angeles from El Toro camp?
What does a chronic record of his known
act. & movement look like starting with the
first & dated previous dates?

See
Delgado Testimony

④ Report does not note the AP report by Harker, on
9 Sept 1963, nor was testimony taken on this
point, though the version that appeared in
Times Picayune must have been seen by him.
It reflects main lines however: p. 412 ff.

Notes

- Soviet reaction to the issuance of the Warren Report
was inquiries in surrounding buildings, to
ascertain available opt. groups. This noted by
Station on 21 Oct 1964. Coverage restricted &
operating by June of next year but U.S. visitors
had become notably fewer and rare. ~~at~~
This decrease U.S. visitors attributable directly
to exposure of the photo.

- Elena Garro de Paz. This is a persistent account
noted by COS in MORA on 12 Oct 1964. Reported
by her to Emb. Political officer, Charles Thomas
10 Dec 1965; she added that in Nov 63 she was
inhibited by an official in the Gobernacion from
going to U.S. Embassy with her story. Story was then
reported [Mapi 562 of 16 Dec 1965] 25 Dec 1965, she
was reinterviewed and supplemented & corrected her earlier
accounts. [NB: Elena Garro is cousin of Horacio
Duran; cousin-in-law of Silvia DURAN.]
NB: Garro was interviewed by Legat on 17 Oct 64 - furnished
similar info but not substantiated by inquiries. Legat
reported his disengagement to COS on 27 Dec 65 &
to Ambassador on 23 Feb 1965. Further means of
communication by Thomas with Elena Garro on
13 July 1966, collateral detail on her attendance
30 June 1966 at Emb. Embassy functions. On 13 Oct 66
Legat confirms that Elena Paz had been registered
23 Nov 1963 at Hotel Vermont, 25-26 & 28-30, as
she had claimed. 7 Feb 67. Memo of Conv.
between Thomas and Elena Garro on her continuing
vicissitudes with Cuban 28 Aug 1967. State Dept
transmits package of Garro de Paz materials as
compiled by Charles William Thomas.

Examples of Repeated & Continuous known acts
loss of labor involvement at heavy or speculative
level - continued:

③ Fundacion Misdegnat's bulletin.

④ Jose I LASAGI, paper, sent to White
House: "Prohibit paych. observation in the
area. J. Lee. Kennedy"

⑤ American Sec. Council Id. Staff: "bodyground
for assassination" - analysis of Moscow
request.

⑥ Ralph de Toledo, Hidden Side of the Oswald
Case.

⑦ Cash Joe Benizera reported by FBI to be
working in Boston looking LTV with FC.
(DBA - 70147)

⑧ Detailed analysis by DILLON - Rep. by Allen & Scott.
of LTV, activity in Soviet Union, under KGB control

⑨ Ex-hunt. Henry J. Taylor died a series in March 67
of articles on Oswald as a Sov. agent.

Nat

- Beginning with 25 Nov. Mexi had a succession of succeeding time consuming and unfruitful cases related to alleged Cuban participation:

25/11-05/12:

Don - info in
memo

- ① Alvarez de investigation (was this for real?)
② Villanueva
③ ~~Barro~~ ^{Barro}
④ Old Day allegations
⑤ Oscar CONTRERAS (1967) (⑥ Robert Edward Ballard - Santa Clara (Calif) prisoner. (N.B. The original FBI memo was destroyed by the FBI.)

- For. relations was unimpaired. in Mexi to say. The link for business and stayed off the phone. There were calls in by Jorgensen and by Oak (B). The former contained speculative suggestive language of personal level. In general all talk of news.

- ✓ - The Cuban reaction was of suggestive interest only in the case of Luisa Calderon.

- There was no specific ref. in newspapers to Mexi or anywhere else that related the detail under investigation or denied "portals" to Cuban retention of alleged participation or knowledge of anti. Castro assassination or direct action in the preceding summer & fall. The reason seems obvious - the one and true perpetrator could not be credibly linked with either the Cubans or the Soviets. Additionally: Was not their method of direct concern to the FBI (see their DBA-77161) ^{Sullivan}

- The interviews with Duran was not structured against the ^{hypothetical} schedule of LHO contacts. His account is therefore ^{inquiries} and ^{how in} (detail/chronology).

- Total inadequacy of reporting and coverage from Miami station for the period after 22 Nov.

- Note Mexico station reported various this tunnel manifested up in Nov - Jan. pertaining to name Oswald "which were blind leads - but which had to be reported.

2 nd phase:

in personal note of telephone conv. with wife brief
asked permission to give legit copies of photo
also Amb. who ^{at 6 PM} decided was right enough to
take copies to Dallas by hand of legit, who
flown up by N.A. Also legit. would mail copies
to Hq. from Dallas. 688 photos, 4 in black
& white, 4 in white. Also provided via HMM mt.
22533, which included the 2 photos of same
person visiting Cuban Embassy. Legit left Mexico
city at 2000 22nd for Dallas. WBB first requested
all photo be flown here (84821 of 23 Nov) but
cancelled it by morning. Following cable
(84822) as press wire photos of Oswald clearly
~~not~~ available. Air 84888 of 23 Nov. clearly indicates
that the photo was not available. Also 84822 and 84823.

First phone

USSR T Call #1?

NO: possible that LHO made call at 1037Z on 28 Sept. for visa for Odessa. Call was in Spanish & went to proper consular number.

LHO recap at Mexico City:

27 Sept 1963: arrives c. 10:00. Went at least

twice to Cuban Cons. and talked with Silvia Herson Cuba #1 visit (presumed) and at least once to Soviet Cons., in between his

two Cuban Cons. visits. Second trip to Cuban Cons. USSR #1 visit (presumed) was c. 1600 (just before closing). After two

Cuban #2 + telegraph visits were sometime before that dinner and his arrival & check in time.

We do not know who he talked to at Sov. Consulate,

— through Silvia Herson talked with at least 2 different Soviet staff

28 Sept 1963 (Saturday): core fact.

813-5571

Caribbean

~~LHO #1~~ ~~USSR #2~~ ~~first~~ ~~visit~~ ~~thing~~ ~~Sat. morning~~ ~~to Sov. Cons.~~ ~~broken to~~ ~~a Consul~~ ~~but had forgotten his address.~~

Cuban #3 LHO goes c. 11:51 to Cuban Cons., gets his address visit + from Silvia Herson [!] and has her call today to USSR Consulate. Soviet says why not come back with it?

USSR #3 LHO presumably made second ~~visit~~ ~~visit~~ ~~(presumed)~~ USSR Cons. with his address. (Apparently he was told Soviets would send a telegram to Washington)

29 Sept 1963 (Sunday) No activity registered

30 Sept 1963 (Monday) No Activity registered

LHO made reservation for space in Mex City - Avenida Cuzco, leaving 2000

1 Oct 1963 (Tuesday) LHO made reservation for Grayhound ~~some from Mexico to Dallas~~

USSR T Call #1 (tel. LHO at 1031 calls on this visit on 28th and talk with number person work. telegram anything new? Given new number to call.

USSR T Call #2 LHO at 1045 calls ~~appears to be~~ ~~identifies self~~ ~~by name~~ ~~for first time~~ ~~Reports~~ ~~since 1st call~~ ~~Given name Kostikov~~

anything new? Nothing, sad but they have been sent. Observed. Long ago.

Question: from above it is clear that LHO contact was on 1 Oct limited to telephone. Why did Win assume he'd find anything corroborative on his film coverage? There is no suggestion in these conversations that LHO had any reason or intent to enter the installation.

NB: I identify with called on 27th & 28 Sept not made until Mexi had taken from Hqs, on its out 1st reporting details of 1 Oct event. I am that there is a comparison made with copy of earlier press. This is plain July 27th & 28th on 10 Oct and not in the development of 27th & 28th.

2 October 1963 (Wednesday) No activity

Registered. [LHO. departs. c. 0830 for Laredo - Dallas.]

3 October 1963 (Thursday). At 1539 there was a call to Sov MA line (Some one used by LHO on USSR Call #1) by individual speaking broken Spanish and then English. Wants a visa for USSR. Directed to call 15-60-55. This is probably not a LHO call.

Coll: ① LHO left Mex City 0830, 2 Oct
② Substrains inconsistent with status
③ Broken Spanish not his bag.

Only the 1 Oct info had been disclosed & disseminated (prior to 22 Nov. and developed in some form, Summary:

① All coverage by CIA during 27 Sept - 2 Oct period was technical, no line source collection

② "LHO" identified self by name only on 1 Oct.

③ D. made at least three entries to Cuban Embassy, 1st 2 on 27 Sept and 1 on 28 Sept. He made at least 3 entries to the Soviet Embassy, 1 on 27 Sept and 2 on Sat. Sept 28th. He made at least 2 telephone calls to Soviet Consulate on 1 October, per evidence of entry in coverage up to at any time.

④ There was no photo coverage of LHO at any time. He was missed on 27th. Camera was off on 28th & 29th (Saturday and Sunday) which was not working.

LHO did not enter any of the installations on 30th.

Deleted of this info was
discussed in
change of
the book

13. Report does not consider Oswald's sequence of activity as an ^{possible} operational continuum in which both Cuba and Cuba's more involved ~~in~~ their secret services than they can afford to admit. The Commission's report should have left ^{a wider} opening on this aspect because:

- ① there was ^{very} reasonable argument and some facts to conclude Swenson, arrest and handling of LHO ("Red Lion") in the Sov. Union and his Cuban interest, included an unresolved contact (Belgoda testimony) which went back to El Toro. And if there ~~was~~ ^{is} any doubt, Nozales's testimony in KGB file is conclusive.
- ② The material furnished by the USSR and Cuba (via Swen) fell far short of anything that fact and reasonable inference suggested.

(This is not to say LHO was under instruction or control.)

14. In addition to the implicit ~~statement~~ ^{acknowledgment} by the house [Caldwell] intercept - she is identified by a ~~known~~ ^{known} ~~person~~ ^{person} ~~as~~ ^{as} having been associated with the DGE during her ~~stay~~ ^{stay} in Mexico - these are

- ① the ~~Canadian~~ ^{Canadian} wife - Benitez, reported after the court - end 1962?

Ricardo L. ~~Alfonso~~ ^{Alfonso}

- ② ~~the~~ ^{the} Santos ~~from~~ ^{from} ~~Albuquerque~~ ^{Albuquerque} ~~born~~ ^{born} 7 Nov 1963 - but reported after the

assassination (NB: Santos was known at one time as "El loco" and eventually was ~~removed~~ ^{removed} from the plague by his government (WFO press & ~~eventually~~ ^{eventually} ~~removed~~ ^{removed} Aug. 1964.

WFO press & ~~eventually~~ ^{eventually} ~~removed~~ ^{removed} Aug. 1964.

Notes

O file - 289248 - was opened on 9 Dec 1960 under the rubric: OSWALD, Lee Henry. Reported to USSA in October 1959.

Note that in our TS to Rosalind 19 Feb 1964 "Inform developed by CIA on the activities of Lee Henry Oswald in Mexico City, September 27 to Oct 3, 1963", para 4, sub 3, we stated:

"^{P. 2}
3. From all the evidence on hand we deduce that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City on the afternoon of 27 Sept 1963 and again sometime on 28 September 1963. There is no evidence that he visited ~~any~~ other place once on the days mentioned, but we cannot exclude these possibilities. The wording in para seven of our report, on pages four and five, is based on the statement of Silvia Hueso and means that Oswald was at the Consulate at least once after his initial visit, and this later visit was on the afternoon of a day on which the Cuban Consul telephoned the Soviet Consulate about Oswald's main problem. This may well have been 28 Sept., but we cannot be certain of the conclusion."

Wave Miami reported by its 8045 of 22 Nov 2242 Z, that AMHINT 53 reported AMSPOLL delegate had radioed that sanction in Aug. 63 on N.O. status w/ DSV. Summoning AMSPOLL files; instructs to receive press release 1300 on 22 NOV.

H-MINT -22533 of 22 Nov 1963 forwarding photos & envelope containing only one photo of subject 4 Oct. No notation on memo transmitted.

Valerij Vlad. KOSTIKOV is identified KGB operationally believing
to be a 13th Dept operative, being known to have worked
in matters of military sabotage. Philosophy of open consultation
on ostensibly non-deductive matters known to be at the
time an accepted doctrinal point at least among GMR.
NB: we passed to FBI unind. (23 Nov) details on Kostikov and
3 finished papers bearing on topic - of these two were
concerned with Sov. use of kid. & drugs. Exh. list. (Aug 61)
& the other, Sov. Inst. Exh. list. (Oct 61)

Dir 84915 of 23 Nov 63 2206Z distrib. to FBI only
the gist of supplementary info reported by Mexi re "North
American on 23rd after full file review

Report from Santiago Club 23 Nov re Cuban bus. reactions
indicated unind. reactions that arose. was "you know a
CIA", Extreme right & segregationist to blame. This
was charge Pedro Martinez PIER. Several times he denied
that assassin was involved in, FPCC insisting that this
person only suspect of extreme rightist & segregationist
is to blame. (This Santiago 6153 IN 67147,
23 Nov 63)

NB: There was no Liemov recorder on Sov. Emb. on 4 Oct.
(see Mexi 7023 - IN 67108). This cable relates the North Amer.
of the 28th calls to Oswald identified in each of 1 Oct, but
indicated no voice comparisons could be done "because
first time exact prior receipt of accused call"

It is clear from context that FBI rep sent spec. to
Dallas afternoon 22nd carried 2 sets of six
photos each referring to Unid. bus. on 1 & 4
Oct. One set of each of these six plus one each of
the photos taken 15th at Cuban Emb. were punched

Meri provided full rundown of all probable calls beginning
the 27th in Odessa & including the 3 October call by the 7033
of 23 Nov 1963 (in 67232)

Meri
Memoranda

Blank

23/4

According to C/LA 23 April 1975, the camera was down on '27 foot for some mechanical malfunctions. He stated he and Shaw worked personally in various & subsequent photo trips. Was certain that was - camera applicable or indisposed. Not a matter of human malfunctions (loading & unloading) either. Would attempt to bring element of recall & consult them on this point. We would get in touch.

Query: granted above, why did we not get O at the Custom installation on 27th 28th?

- Cuban Cruise - powered by the police. IR intercept worked out to him
- At morning gets - coverage of Cuban atmosphere oriented, powered by a Cuban. He also even doing other things. He did radio dispatching

film collected about twice a week - collected processed & strip printed. Turn around time say for picking up a Monday would be delivery on Friday
from Mike's favor

Out of town
Tom Keenan
Cordy Peters

3 photos here showing activity
2 in front - but back
at front, high contrast

Open that Mexico City station, within its
area, in mid

~~position to do anything~~

limitations and capabilities had done
that

all it could, under in compliance with

Headquarters instructions: there were no

further contacts by Oswald to report, however,
it was ultimately ascertained,

he had left Mexico City, ~~therefore~~ on 2 October

and ~~was with~~ ^{was with} photographs ~~that~~ it would
take very special efforts,

have ~~been able to~~ ^{been able to} make a positive

identification ~~in~~ in view of Oswald's hotel

registration under alias.

Tall wrote Michael Farmer

1. Mexi 6453 (IN 36017, 9 Oct, 00042 Fin)
Action to WBS.

2. Di 74676 to SHG, 351 < NW, 20.12.2

3. Hi 74830 to Mexi, ref. Mex 6453
22092.

4. Mexi 6534, 15 Oct 1963 In 40357
17302. (ref. for photo)

Who is:

NI Report in OA

Edward S. Butler - Ex. Dir. of the
Information Council of the Americas New Orleans.
His was testimony not taken from this man.

Get (Sovs) pressed info by / for Ted to look at.

✓ Get copy of Assoc. West report for
Mr. Selin & forward via channels or
otherwise.

✓ Call Dine on non-family of Cuban
side.

✓ Call Eddie & tell him about 12th

✓ Get distribution copy of Alstern & Lott

Check to see if there is a 201 on V.I. PETROV who
was allegedly reported 11 Nov 1959 as KGB chief
Bridgman in SSK. The MVD man at this time was
A.N. AKSENOV.

Discuss Shostakov with P. Hartman

discussions with H. Phillips 28 April - it was
Cuban camera this was done. He does
not object to the use of the photo in any way
but would prefer freezing the background
to explain future of Sov. Emb. command &
outlook CTR.

- Get Vols I & II of the 201

- Get pulled back the R&T Chrono for end
1963 & first 18 months 64.

- We must fill in the sequence of discussion with
the Commission staff re the photo -

- are there any people - in, thru or unnecessary
pieces relating to relations with the
Commission?

28/4

Mike Farmer - servicing of Sov Ent. camera which
was automatic & clock operated - Cuban
divice was down (Allen White) - but was
normally operating.